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Abstract. This paper juxtaposes changes over the last forty years in income growth and distribution with 
the mortality changes recorded at the aggregate level in about 170 countries and at the individual level in 
21 countries with at least two Demographic and Health Surveys covering the last twenty years. Over the 
1980s-and 1990s, the infant-mortality rate (IMR), under-5 mortality rate (U5MR) and Life Expectancy at 
Birth (LEB) mostly continued the favourable trends that characterized the 1960s and 1970s. Yet, especially, 
the 1990s the pace of health improvement was slower than that recorded during the prior decades. In 
addition, the distribution between countries of aggregate health improvements became markedly more 
skewed. These trends are in part explained by the negative changes recorded in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Eastern Europe, but are robust to the removal of the two regions from the sample. This tendency is 
observed also at the intra-regional level, with the exception of Western Europe. Thirdly, DHS data for 21 
developing countries point to a frequent divergence over time in the within-country distribution of gains in 
IMR and U5MR among children living in urban vs. rural areas and belonging to families part of different 
quantiles of the asset distribution, while IMR differentials by level of education of the mother show mixed 
trends The paper concludes by underscoring the similarities and linkages between changes in income 
inequality and health inequality and suggests some tentative explanations of these trends without, however, 
formally testing them. 
JEL: I12, I21, I31,J13, J16 
 
1. Introduction.  
The debate on the pace of improvement and convergence in levels of well-being between 
and within developed and developing countries has acquired a particular relevance during 
the recent decade of economic liberalisation and globalisation. Though health trends can be 
– and indeed are - affected by non-economic and non-policy factors, sustained 
improvements and convergence over time in levels of well-being across and within countries 
could be interpreted as a broad indication of the success of the liberal approach to policy 
making (Dollar 2001). In turn, slow progress and growing divergence might reinforce the 
claims of the critics of globalisation who argue that the latter is inefficient and that – both 
globally and within each nation – ‘the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer’. 
The attention received by such debate in policy circles has substantially increased in the 
aftermath of the UN Millennium Assembly that set clear targets, among others, for poverty 
incidence, IMR and U5MR and a number of differentials in well-being, and refocused 
economic and social policies on the achievement of such targets.   
 
In this regard, the evidence about the pace of growth of GDP per capita in the developed and 
developing regions in the 1980s and 1990s shows a marked increase in regional variation in 
relation to the prior decades, with sharp accelerations in some regions and prolonged 
stagnation in others. As for the trends in the distribution of income per capita, it appears that 
– while the within-country dispersion has increased in the vast majority of the countries with 
adequate information – the debate on between-country inequality remains inconclusive as 
                                                 
1 Work on this paper by Giovanni Andrea Cornia was carried out in the context and with the financial 
support of the project ‘Health and Social Upheaval’ sponsored by the J.and C. MacArthur Foundation.   
2 The authors would like to thank Stefano Morandini for excellent research assistance.  
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statistical assumptions on which they rest.  
 
To break this stalemate, this paper juxtaposes changes in the pace of improvement and in the 
distribution of wellbeing in both the monetary and health space. While data problems persist 
also in the evaluation of health-wellbeing, an analysis of between- and within-country 
convergence in this field does not pose the difficult statistical problems encountered in the 
analysis of convergence in GDP per capita. Analysis of health convergence is less 
susceptible of statistical biases and its results should therefore be less controversial than 
thsoe about income convergence.   
 
2. The valuation of changes in well-being over time 
Traditionally, economists measure 'well-being' on the basis of monetary indicators. In this 
type of analysis, gains (losses) of well-being are normally associated with a rise (decline) 
in average incomes or consumption, or with increases in the number of people emerging 
from (falling into) poverty. While useful and widely applied, this approach suffers from 
considerable theoretical and informational problems and can - particularly during periods 
of structural transformation such as those experienced by many countries during the last 
two decades - lead to partial or even erroneous conclusions. First of all, there are several 
factors other than current income that influence health well-being, including household’s 
assets, human capital, time use, structure and stability, and health practices, as well as 
income inequality and instability, the relative prices of essential goods, and public health 
expenditure. Also, an increase (decline) in income normally triggers a series of household 
and collective responses (including the search for greater efficiency in expenditure, shifts 
in consumption structure, and so forth) which can cushion households from the negative 
effects of income reductions, or change consumer behaviour in a way that reduces the 
positive health impact of income rises. Indeed, it is not uncommon to observe 
improvements in health indicators concomitantly with declines in household incomes, or 
a stagnation or decline in health status and growing health differentials in parallel with an 
income expansion. The income approach, furthermore, suffers from additional problems 
when used in cross-country comparisons entailing the definition of a common poverty 
line and the choice of an appropriate exchange rate to convert incomes in national 
currencies into a common monetary yardstick such as the US dollar. Finally, contrary to 
an erroneous but common perception, income is not easily measurable, especially during 
periods of high inflation, radical fluctuations in relative prices and rapid structural 
change.  
  Any attempt at measuring convergence in levels of well-being requires therefore 
that the analyses in the monetary space be integrated with an examination of trends in the 
capabilities-space. Both approaches are applied below. However, as the changes in 
monetary well-being are well documented in the literature, the main emphasis of the 
paper is on the pace and distribution of health improvements, as measured by LEB, its 
complement to 100 years (an arbitrary upper bound for this variable, see later), IMR and 
U5MR.   
  In doing so, we do not concentrate only on average national changes over time but 
examine – within the limitations imposed by data availability – also the changes 
intervened in the distribution of such gains between and within countries as well as trends 
in health differentials within countries. Steep health differentials have been observed for 
long in many developed and developing world owing to an unequal distribution of 
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during the last decades with the appearance of rigourous studies and the adoption of 
national or international targets in this area. In the United Kingdom Europe, for instance, 
the famous Black Report (Black et al. 1980) focussed its attention on the steep health 
gradient observed among different groups of civil servants. Concern for reducing 
inequality in health was evident also in the WHO ‘Health for All’ strategy and the related 
target setting exercises that in 1984 set average goals for health indicators but also posited 
that ‘… by the year 2000, the actual differences in health status between countries and 
between groups within countries, should be reduced by at least 25%’(Whitehead 1990, 
cited in Gwatkin 2000). Likewise, the Director General of the World Health Organisation 
recently stated there is a need to greatly reduce the burden of excess mortality on the 
poor. Concern for the health impact of economic policies have intensified with the 
introduction in many countries over the last two decades of structural adjustment 
programs, that may have inadvertently shifted the policy focus from the search of ‘Health 
for All’ and the achievement of the MDG.   
 
The emphasis placed not only on average progress but also on the reduction of health 
differentials rests on four arguments. First, according to most theories of justice an 
average improvement in IMR or LEB characterized by high variation around the mean 
receives a lower social valuation than an equal improvement characterized by a more 
egalitarian distribution around the mean. Second, targeting health intervention on the 
deprived groups would permit to achieve faster average improvements than if it were 
directed to the general population. In many cases, high rates of child or adult mortality in 
underserved areas can be reduced by low-cost public health interventions, while the 
further reduction of already comparatively low mortality rates in urban areas is more 
costly and difficult to achieve. Greater equity in health can thus be a source of greater 
aggregate efficiency. Third, regardless of their absolute level, large health differentials, or 
their increase over time, may exacerbate the perception of the unfairness of the social 
relations prevailing in a given country and raise in this way political instability. Finally, a 
rise in health differentials, or their persistence at high level, openly collide with the 
emphasis placed by the Human Rights Convention on the well being of every individual. 
Rapid rights improvements limited to only a few groups and on average are not sufficient 
to fulfil the prescription of the HRC and of the MDG.    
 
3. Changes in GDP/capita and its distribution during the last decades 
Changes in this area are well documented and are only briefly summarized hereafter to 
contrast them with the less well documented and analyzed changes in the pace and 
distribution of health improvements over the last two decades. In addition, as it will appear 
later in the paper, changes in GDP/c are important determinants of changes in health status, 
especially in the 120 or so countries with a GDP per capita of less than US$2,000, while 
shifts in income distribution have been shown to affect health levels and differentials in both 
developed and developing countries.   
 
3.1 Changes in GDP/C 
Table 1 describes a well-known story, i.e. the slowdown in global growth between the 
‘second Golden Age of Capitalism’ (roughly the first two decades in Table 1) and the Era 
of Liberalisation and Globalisation of the 1980s and 1990s. It documents also the shifts in 
the sources of world growth from the industrialized countries and towards China, India 
and other Asian nations. However, given their initial small size, the growth upsurge in 
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OECD countries, leading in this way to a deceleration in the global growth of GDP/c. 
 
This slowdown in global growth – and its implications for well-being in the monetary 
space – were somehow unexpected, particularly in the 1990s. While this decade 
witnessed a rise in the number of civil conflicts and natural disasters, these generally had 
a limited effect on global growth. At the same time, the decade witnessed a number of 
positive shocks that – ceteris paribus – should have raised growth, family incomes and 
wellbeing. Among these, low real interest rates on dollar and Euro denominated loand 
since 1992, a ‘peace dividend’ equal to 2-3 per cent of the GDP of the OECD countries 
due to the end of the Cold War, a ‘market dividend’ expected from the transition to the 
market economy of the former communist countries, the steady spread of democracy and 
the diffusion of the information and tele-communication revolution that was expected to 
raise by one percentage point the long run growth rate of the countries adopting the new  
technology on a broad scale. Finally, in the 1990s, all developing regions but Africa 
enjoyed a ‘demographic dividend’ as the labour force grew faster than the population.  
 
In spite of all this, the last 20 years witnessed a decline in the rate of growth of world 
GDP per capita (Table 1) that fell from 2.61 per cent a year over 1960-80 to 1.28 over 
1980-2000. Growth was particularly weak in the 1990s owing to stagnation in Europe 
and Japan, economic collapse in the European economies in transition, the persistent 
difficulties faced by Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa despite widespread policy 
reform, stagnation in MENA and – to a lesser extent – the Asian economies affected by a 
growing number of financial, banking and currency crises. Over 1997 and 1998, for 
example, the world growth declined by one full percentage GDP point because of the 
East Asian crisis. In contrast, China and India recorded a rapid acceleration in the tempo 
of growth following some domestic liberalization, greater export orientation and a 
general opening up of the economy inspired by a pragmatic, home-grown pattern of 
reforms considerably more selective and gradual than the standard prescription.  
 
Table 1.Decadal GDP/c growth rates by main regions   
   1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 90-2000  1960-80  1980-00
High income countries  4.32 2.58 2.47 1.79  3.45  2.13
Low & middle income countries  2.75 3.34 0.88 1.58  3.05  1.23
Low- Middle Income (excl.China, India)  n.a n.a n.a n.a  n.a  n.a 
        
 - East Asia & Pacific  2.39 4.57 5.58 6.39  3.47  5.98
   - China  1.49  4.36 7.68 8.95  2.92  8.31
   - East Asia & Pacific (excl. China)  2.94 4.36 1.85 2.81  3.65  2.33
 - Eastern Europe & Central Asia    5.0*  2.3*  2.1* -1.82           n.a           n.a
 - Latin America & Caribbean  2.47 3.37 -0.84 1.65  2.92  0.40
 - Middle East & North Africa  n.a n.a -1.31 1.22  n.a ‐ 0.05
 - South Asia  1.92 0.65 3.36 3.30  1.28  3.33
    - India  1.70 0.68 3.58 3.63  1.19  3.61
     - South Asia (excl. India)  2.49 0.54 2.50 2.31  1.51  2.40
 - Sub-Saharan Africa  2.56 0.73 ‐1.15 ‐0.38  1.64 ‐ 0.77
        
World  3.40 1.82 1.36 1.20  2.61  1.28
Source: authors’ calculation on WDI (2004), Notes: the regional aggregates include only developing 
countries (e.g. East Asia does not include Japan); * The data in the various columns refer to the periods 
1950-70, 1970-80, 1980-90 and are from Cornia and Danziger (1997). 
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noting. With negative or zero growth in GDP/c in 58 countries, and with growth rising  
by less than 1% in another 15 nations located mainly in Eastern Europe, MENA, Sub-
Saharan Africa, Latin America and part of South Asia, income-poverty either deteriorated 
or improved slowly (WDI 2004). In contrast, despite growing distributive tensions (see 
later), poverty declined faster than in the past owing to the rapid growth of the 1980s and 
a slower but acceptable expansion in the 1990s in East and South East Asia, an 
acceleration of growth in India in relation to the Golden Age and – especially – the 
economic miracle of China. Over 1980-2000, this country doubled the already 
respectable rate of growth recorded over the 1970s. Quite clearly, such acceleration of 
growth generated large gains in monetary well-being in important sections of these 
societies, as indicated by the rapid decline in poverty recorded over the last two decades 
in India, Vietnam and, especially, China (World Bank 2000). These trends together with 
those recorded in the field of income distribution led to an increasingly more unequal 
inter-regional distribution of poverty. 
 
3.2 Changes in income distribution  
The distribution of per capita income among the citizens of the world can be exactly 
decomposed into the distribution of average income per capita between-countries and the 
distribution of income per capita within-countries. Most studies suggest that inequality 
between-countries accounts for 60-90 percent of global inequality (depending on the 
index used) and that inequality within countries explains the remaining 10-40 percent
3.  
 
The post-World War II trends in within-country income inequality are fairly well 
documented and analyzed, especially since the early 1980s, and there is growing 
agreement in the literature on the fact that within-country inequality has increased in  
most regions during the last 20-25 years
4. Indeed, a host of recent works in this area, to 
which the interested reader is referred to (see Smeeding 2002, Szekely and Hilgert 1999, 
Milanovic 1998, Cornia 2004,) suggest that in several (if certainly not all) countries 
inequality declined during the first 20-25 years of the post-World War II period following 
a fall in unemployment, stable earnings inequality and growing redistribution in the 
OECD and socialist countries, and the introduction of programs of land reform, 
educational enlargement and some redistribution in developing countries.  
 
Starting from the mid 1970s, and increasingly so since the early 1980s, frequent reversals 
in national inequality trends were observed in the OECD countries (beginning with the 
USA, UK, Australia and New Zealand) and in Latin America. In the latter region, the 
1980s were characterised by highly regressive outcomes as inequality rose in all but three 
countries. In the 1990s, despite the return to full capacity growth, the liberalisation of the 
external sector and an increase in FDI, inequality worsened further in eight cases and 
stagnated in seven (Székely and Hilgert 1999).  
 
The 1990s also witnessed growing income polarisation in the economies in transition. 
Inequality rises were moderate in the countries of Central Europe but explosive in those 
of the former USSR and South Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, in China inequality rose 
slowly over 1978-1984 but its rate of increase accelerated over 1985-90 and, even more, 
after 1990. A reversal of the inequality trend was observed also in the economies of the 
                                                 
3 This was not true before the industrial revolution when  most of global inequality was explained by 
within-country inequality (see the data for  1820 and 1870 in Table 2)  
4 However, an earlier article (Li, et al. 1998) argued that within-country inequality remained stable over 1950-1990 
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falling inequality, as well as in the stable-inequality countries of South Asia. However, in 
both these two groups of countries, this reversal took place later and was less marked 
than in other regions. For instance, in South Korea earnings inequality declined steadily 
over three decades and started rising only in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis. Distributive 
tensions emerged also in Indonesia and the Philippines already before the Asian crisis and 
intensified after it. As for India, the gradual liberalisation of the economy in the 1990s led 
to an acceleration of growth and exports but also to a moderate rise in both urban and 
rural inequality and a larger rise in overall inequality due to the widening of the urban-
rural income gap (Deaton and Drèze 2002). This tendency was less marked in Sub-
Saharan Africa and remains largely undocumented in the MENA region due to lack of  
data.  
 
In summing up this empirical evidence, Cornia (2004) concludes that income inequality 
rose – though by different extents, with a different timing and with likely different effects 
on well-being - in 53 of the 73 countries analyzed in his work, including most large 
economies such as China, India, Indonesia, the USA, Japan, all large Latin American 
nations, Russia and practically all other countries in transition. Only in nine small and 
medium sized countries (such as Honduras, Jamaica, France and Malaysia) there was 
evidence of a decline in inequality over time and only in 16 (including Germany) 
inequality remained broadly constant.  
 
Such overall trend towards rising within-country inequality is captured also in studies of 
global inequality (Sala-I-Martin 2002, Bourguignon and Morisson 2002), in which the 
latter is decomposed into within-country and a between-country components. Table 2 
below, for instance, shows that after having declined since 1910, the aggregate within-
country component of total inequality started rising around 1970s.   
 
Table 2. Trend in global,  within- and between-country income inequality, 1820-1992 
  1820 1870 1910 1950 1960 1970 1980 1992 
Gini Coefficient  (global inequality)  0.500 0.560 0.610 0.640 0.635 0.650 0.657 0.657 
          
Theil Coefficient          
Inequality within  country  groups  0.462 0.484 0.498 0.323 0.318 0.315 0.330 0.342 
Inequality between  country  groups  0.061 0.188 0.299 0.482 0.458 0.492 0.499 0.513 
Total  (global)  inequality  0.522 0.672 0.797 0.805 0.776 0.808 0.829 0.855 
          
Mean logarithmic deviation          
Inequality within  country  groups  0.370 0.382 0.399 0.303 0.300 0.304 0.321 0.332 
Inequality between  country  groups  0.053 0.162 0.269 0.472 0.466 0.518 0.528 0.495 
Total  (global)  inequality  0.422 0.544 0.668 0.775 0.766 0.823 0.850 0.827 
Source: Bourguignon and Morisson (2002)  
 
This brief summary suggests that the declines in income inequality observed during the 
Golden Age were often reversed over the last two decades. As a result, the domestic 
Gini coefficients followed in several cases a more or less pronounced and symmetric U-
shaped trend, with the turn-around year placed most frequently between 1980 and 1990. 
Though other factors have contributed to this trend, the inequality reversals of the last 
two decades suggests are likely to be associated with the widespread shifts from a 
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5. Obviously, this trend should not be 
extrapolated into an inexorable rise in inequality in the future as, when the policy shift 
has fully taken place, the right arm of the U should stabilize at the ‘steady state 
inequality level’ typical of the new policy regime, as observed for instance in the UK 
where – after a rise of 11 points over 1979-90 – the Gini coefficient of disposable 
income stabilized over the subsequent decade.          
 
2.3 Studies of changes in between-country and global inequality. 
The evidence on the trends on between-country inequality are, in contrast, far less 
conclusive, and indeed there are as many studies claiming that the average income gap 
between rich and poor countries diminished (mainly because of rapid growth in China, 
India and East Asia) while several others claim precisely the opposite. The 
inconlusiveness of this debate does not allow to draw any conclusion about convergence 
in incomes per capita across countries and about the global equity of the liberalisation 
and globalisation policies adopted to a different extent by most countries over the last 
few decades.          
 
Indeed, as indicated in Table 3, studies in this area point to different results about the trend 
of between-country (and, given its predominance, global) income inequality and do not 
allow to come to robust conclusions on whether the relative income gap between countries 
has converged, stagnated or diverged
6. This situation is explained by the fact that the 
measurement of the level and trend of between-country and global inequality depends to a 
considerable extent on a long series of methodological choices made by each researcher. 
These include the inequality index chosen; the period of analysis considered; the ‘correct 
measurement’ of the (presumably overstated) Chinese rate of growth in the 1990s; whether 
the comparisons are carried out on the basis of  GDP/c derived from the National Accounts 
or the disposable income per capita derived from Household Income and Expenditure 
Surveys; whether average GDP/c or income/c of each country are weighed by their 
population size; whether the converison in dolalr is ewffected by means of the market 
exchange rate or the PPP exchange rate; whether it is assumed that all citizens of one 
nation have the same income per capita, or  synthetic statistics of the distribution of income 
(such as the Gini or Theil coefficients) are used, or on micro-data depicting precisely the 
distribution of income/c are relied upon; the hypotheses made about the shape of income 
distribution for countries and years with missing data; the treatment of large highly 
dualistic countries, such as China and India, as a single nation, two separate sub-nations 
(each comprised of an urban and rural sector) or as multiple nations (as in the case of the 
                                                 
5 Other hypotheses put forward to account for the observed rise in within-country income inequality focus on South-
North trade and migration, and technological change. These explanations may apply in a few cases but are not 
sufficiently general to explain for the widespread increase in inequality observed in very different country settings 
(Cornia 2004)    
6 Things are quite different if between-country inequality is assessed not as a ratio of but as the absolute differences 
between the GDP/c of the countries involved. In the latter case, the evidence clearly points to a growing North-South 
polarization. For instance, even if China grows at 8% a year from a GDP/c of 2000 US$PPP per capita, and Europe 
grows at only 1.5% a year from an intial base of 30.000 US$PPP per capita, after the first year, the relative income gap 
(the ratio of the GDP/c of China vs Europe) declines but the absolute income gap rises  by 290 US$PPP.  Given the 
differences in initial GDP/c capita, the absolute income gap between China, India and SEAsia has continued widening 
and – on current trends - will continue to do so for another 30-40 years, despite the much faster rate of growth of the 
latter economies. This apsect of convergence has, however, escaped most of the debate. As noted by Wade (2002, p.23) 
‘The other strong conclusion is that absolute income gaps between the West and the rest are widening, even in the case 
of relatively fast growing countries like China and India and are likely to go on widening for another half century at 
least. No one disputes this, but globalists tend to focus on relative incomes only’ (emphasis added).  
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calculation of between-country and global inequality. As the table shows, different 
approaches lead to different conclusions about between country and global inequality.  
  
Table 3. Findings of studies on changes over time in within-county, between-country and 
global inequality     
  Period 
Covered 
Exchange 













Approach  followed  and main 
assumptions 
UNCTAD (1997)  1980-90  Market   Gini   …..     Up   ….  Uses  GDP/c  and  income 
shares 
UNDP (1999)  1960-97  Market   Quintile 
ratio 
…..     Up    ….  Uses GDP/c 
Korzeniewicz and 
Moran (1997) 




    Up  
    Up 
 Uses  GDP/c 
           
Schultz (1998)  1968-89  PPP  Gini  
Gini(excl 
China) 
    Up  
    Up  
 Down  
 Stable   
 Down  
    Up  

























GDP/c and quintile shares for 
125 countries (for 57 of them 
assumptions made on 
shape/stability of distribution) 
National trends in quintile 









    Up 
    Up 
….. 
    Up 
  Down 
Stable      
    Up   
   Down 
GDP/c and income shares 
to proxy the distribution of 





1980-93 Afriat  Gini 
Theil 
SCV 
    Up 
    Up 
    Up 
Slightly  up 
      Up 
     Up 
    Up    
    Up   
    Up     
Uses GDP/c and income 
shares   
           
Milanovic (2000)  1988-93  PPP  Gini 
Theil 
    Up   
    Up   
    Up 
    Up  
    Up     
    Up   
Income/c and original 
distributions from 91 nations.     
Large Asian countries are 
separated into rural and urban  
           
Li, Squire, Zou 
(1998)   
1980-92     n.a.  Gini    Stable     n.a.      n.a.  49 countries   
linear trend regression  
Cornia (2002)  1980-95     n.a.  Gini     Up     n.a.      n.a.  73 countries  
quadratic trend regression 
Source: Cornia (2004) which includes also the bibliographical references reported in the table.  
 
4. The pace of improvement and distribution of health gains during the 
last decades 
In most regions, the last 20 years have witnessed a continuation of the improvements in 
key health indicators (IMR, U5MR) recorded over 1960-1980 (Fox 1998). However,  to 
be able to offer an unambigously favourable evaluation of this encouraging news, it is 
necessary that such aggregate gains occurred at a pace similar to or faster than that 
realized over the preceding two decades; concerned all or most regions and countries; and 
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and children born to mothers with low education).    
 
4.1 Evidence from the literature  
There is a small but growing literature on changes in health status and convergence in 
LEB, IMR, U5MR and the death rate of specific age groups. For reasons of space, only 
the most salient studies in this literature are reviewed hereafter. We divide such literature 
in three parts corresponding to the empirical analysis we carry out below.  
 
(i) pace of improvement in health status. Quite apart from the literature developed in 
the context of the achievement of the MDG, most of the literature in this area mainly 
focuses on whether positive changes were continued over time, regardless of their pace. 
In reviewing changes in IMR, LEB and life expectancy at age 1, for instance, Fox (1998) 
emphasizes that progress continued uninterrupted for all these indicators for both 
developing and developed countries, but does not explore whether the gains he refers to 
have taken place at the same, faster or slower pace than in the past.  Likewise, in 
analyzing changes in LEB over 1980-2000, Goesling and Firebaugh (2004) note that in 
the 1990s the increase in LEB in rich countries was smaller than that recorded in the 
developing countries but do not compare it with that they recorded over the prior decade 
or two. However, Wagstaff and Cleason (2004) note that, in the 1990s, progress in 
U5MR reduction has been slower than in the 1980s and than the progress needed to 
achieve the MDGs in this area.  However, Deaton (2004) points to a worldwide reduction 
in the rate of decline of child mortality and to slower gains in child mortality. In turn, 
Deaton and Drèze (2002) as well as others have underscored that in India IMR declined 
during the 1990s by only 12.5 percent as against 30 percent in the 1980s. This is an 
important point to which we shall return in section 5. 
 
(ii) between-country convergence in health status. Many demographers have, over the 
past three decades, pointed to growing convergence in health status between the 
developing and the developed countries. Wilson (2001), for instance, found that life 
expectancy converged across countries starting from 1950. Meyer (2001), in turn, focuses 
on club convergence, by emphasizing that the (unweighed) distribution of life expectancy 
across countries remained twin peaked over 1960-1997 despite the ‘migration’ of several 
countries from the left to the right peak and the increase over time in the mode of each of 
the two components of this bi-modal distribution. In this way, a trend towards   
convergence is evident only within the low-LEB club of poor countries and within the 
high-LEB club of rich ones. Poor nations appear to be converging to a life expectancy of 
45-50 years, while the better off ones are coming together at a level of 75-80 years.    
 
Likewise, Micklewright and Stewart (1999) find that the standard deviation of the 
distribution of underfive mortality of the 15 members of the European Union declined 
over 1970-95 by some 90 percent as death rates in the countries of Southern Europe 
moved closer to those of the Northern European countries. Convergence was also found – 
if at a lower pace – for the mortality rate of children of 5-14 years of age, while the 
standard deviation of the mortality rates of those of 15-24 years (that depend more on  
behaviours than access to health care) declined only marginally. Convergence for the first 
two indicators was to a considerable extent policy-driven. Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty 
established a Cohesion Fund that provides structural and regional funds equivalent to 3-4 
% of the GDP of the reciepient countries to help the four nations with relatively lower 
GDP per capita to catch up with the EU average. Participation in the EU may have also 
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members of the union had to gradually adopt advanced standards – the so called acquis 
communautaires - in several health–related areas.    
 
Recent analyses point, however, to growing between-country divergence in health status  
owing to the dramatic worsening of health trends in Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern 
Europe, the slow gains recorded in China despite a quadrupling of GDP/c over 1980-
2000 (see later) and the underperformance of some countries of the other regions. In this 
regard, Goesling and Firebaugh (2004) analyze the distribution of life expectancy at birth 
of 169 countries for the period 1980-2000. They note that while 1980-1990 LEB 
increased in all regions, it then declined over 1990-2000 in Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
transition economies. These divergent paths have led to a polarisation of the cross 
country distribution  of LEB, as confirmed by the upward trend recorded since 1992 in  
relative measures of dispersion of the distribution of life expectancy such as the Gini 
coefficient (that best captures changes in the middle of the distribution), the Theil index 
and the squared coefficient of variation (both particularly sensitive to changes at the top 
of the distribution), and the mean logarithmic devation (that best captures changes at the 
bottom of the distribution). Thus, health inequality declined until 1992 but then increased 
significantly between 1992 and 2000. A decomposition of this increase in LEB inequality 
into changes in population shares and life expectancy ratios led them to conclude that – 
although only one-tenth of the world’s population lives in Sub-Saharan Africa – the 
HIV/AIDS driven decline in LEB (- 3.5 years on average, as opposed to a worldwide 
increase of 1.2 years) was the main factor in the recent divergence. When Sub-Saharan 
Africa was remouved from the sample, the cross-country divergence in LEB disappeared 
as, he argues, the increased divergence caused by the fall in life expectancy in the 
transition economies was compensated by the rapid rise recorded in populous India.  
 
Also McMichael et al. (2004) question the empirical evidence of LEB convergence. They 
identify in fact three sets of countries, the first (composed mainly of advances nations) 
with a plateauing trend, a second group of middle-income countries converging rapidly 
towards the LEB of the advanced nations, and a third group comprising at least 42 
countries (mostly from Sub-Saharan Africa and the economies in transition, but including 
also the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Fiji, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq and North Korea) 
that had in 2001 a lower life expectancy than in 1960, 1980 or 1990. In their view, the 
usual explanation of health convergence (i.e. the rapid fall in deaths due to infectious 
diseases in poorer countries and the slowlier decline in mortality due to chronic diseases) 
has to be enlarged so as to take into account the new life-threatening challenges faced in 
the economic, social and environmental areas. 
 
(iii) within-country convergence in health indicators and mortality differentials. 
Average improvements in aggregate within-country health indicators may result from 
widely different rates of improvements among social groups identified on the basis of 
gender, rural-urban residence, region, income class, ethnic group, level education and 
labour market status of the head of the household. In the worst cases, an average 
improvement may result from progress among the top ‘x’ percent of the population and 
retrogression among the remaining (100-x) percent. Hereafter we  review some of the 
common findings of the literature on health differentials, particularly the analyses that 
focus on their changes over time.  
 
  10The first observation in this regard is that large health differentials are observed in 
practically all countries, including the most advanced one. Ruzicka et al (1989) provide a 
comprehensive discussion of trends and methodological problems in the field of 
differential mortality for a variety of countries. 
 
One of the most important differentials in infant mortality is that by level of education of 
the mother (Caldwell 1979, Bicego and Boerma 1993). Greater education among mothers 
is also found to reduce the IMR differential by gender (Murthi et al. 1995). The region 
and, in particular, the type (rural or urban) of residence are among the strongest   
correlates of infant and child mortality, the common presumption being that the place of 
residence accounts for different access to sanitation, housing and health and educational 
services (Defo 1996, Sastry 1996, Lalou and Le Grand 1996, Jhamba 1999). Health 
differentials by income level are equally marked. In an analysis of ethnic differentials in 
child mortality in 11 African countries, Brockerhoff and Hewett (2000) identify 
significant and growing differentials which are closely linked to economic inequality and 
uneven access to services by different tribes (Table 4).  
 
Table 4. Mortality differentials among ethnic groups in selected African countries  
Ivory Coast (Others/Baulé)  Kenya (Others/Kikuyu) Senegal  (Others/Serer) 
-  1970-4       1.32   -  1968-72         1.71  -  1968-72       0.84 
-  1980-4       1.47  -  1978-82         3.27  -     1978-82       0.90 
-  1990-4       1.21  -  1988-92         2.87  -     1988-92       1.28 
 Source: Brockerhoff and Hewett (2000) 
 
The third point, central to the analysis of this paper, is that in more egalitarian societies, 
mortality differentials are not as glaring as in unequal societies. This is an important point 
that needs underscoring, as mortality differentials narrow with an improvement of the 
average only if development policy explicitly focus on equity. Hardly ever, a class-
neutral, gender-neutral and region-neutral development policy is able to reduce mortality 
differentials, even in the presence of sizeable average improvements. For instance, in the 
USA,  IMR declined to a then record low of 7.9 per 1,000 live births in 1994. At the same 
time, the black/white IMR ratio grew from 1.6 in 1950 to 2.2 in 1991 (Cornia and Danziger 
1997). Likewise, an analysis of survey data on inequalities in U5MR by consumption 
quintiles for 9 developing countries finds statistically significant inequalities for most 
cases. U5MR differentials were particularly pronounced in highly unequal Brazil where 
an IMR concentration index of –0.322 was found. At the opposite end of the spectrum, 
the concentration index was -0.016 in Vietnam and -0.028 in Ghana, i.e. countries where 
consumption inequality was less pronounced (Wagstaff 2000). In turn, Wilkinson (1996) 
reports a comparison in infant mortality rates by social class between England & Wales and 
Sweden, which shows a marked social gradient in the first one but not in the latter, as 
Sweden was strongly committed to reducing health inequality.  
 
The recent increase in within-country income inequality (section 3) does not bode well 
for the future of health inequality, though – in some countries – the negative effect of 
growing income inequality might have been compensated by the introduction of public 
health programmes with a progressive or proportional incidence. In this regard, growing 
mortality differentials by income level are reported by Delamonica and Minujin (2003) 
on DHS data for 24 developing countries. The study covers changes intervened over the 
1980s and 1990s in the ratio of the U5MR of children of families belonging to the bottom 
  1120 per cent of the household distribution ordered in ascending order of an “asset index”
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to the U5MR of children of households belonging to the top 20 per cent of the same 
distribution. In the 1980s, such ratio was found to range between 1.3 to 4.7 in the 1980s, 
with an average of 2.2. However, over the next ten years such ratio worsened in 11 of the 
24 countries considered, remained constant in 10 and improved in three with relatively 
small populations. Such trend was observed not only in countries in which the average 
U5MR worsened or remained constant but also in 7 (out of 13) where the average 
declined. In these countries, the average U5MR reduction was mostly driven by the 
decline in child mortality of the middle and top income groups. Meanwhile, among the 
poor such reduction was considerably lower or statistically not different from zero.  
 
A recent analysis of IMR differentials in China making use of census and population 
survey data by Zhang and Kanbur (2003) found that, while the nationwide IMR declined 
sharply from the 1960s to the 1980s, it then levelled off or was reversed in recent times 
due mainly to the surge in rural IMR from 37 to 44.8 per thousand between 1981 and 
1995. As a result the ratio of rural/urban IMR rose from 1.5 to 2.1, while the female/male 
IMR ratio rose from 0.9 to 1.3. In addition, there was a sharp increase in regional 
variability of health outcomes as signalled by the respective rise in the Gini and Theil 
coefficient of the regional distribution of IMR from 22.4 to 34.8 and from 9.3 to 19.4. A 
decomposition of the Theil index into within-urban plus within-rural versus between 
urban-rural inequality shows that both components contributed to the overall surge in 
IMR inequality by region but that the between-component rose faster that the within-
component. The authors link these adverse effects to the fiscal decentralisation of 1978, 
the dissolution of the communes, the authorisation of private medical practices in 1984 
and the freedom granted to urban-based SOEs to lay off workers and cut health subsidies. 
The authors conclude by noting that, given the weakness of safety nets and social 
insurance arrangements in urban areas and the limited fiscal power of villages, it was to 
be expected that increases in income inequality would translate into increasing health 
inequality. This conclusion is confirmed by the modest gains in LEB recorded in China 
over 1980 and 2000 (Table 5) despite the quadrupling of GDP/c over the same period.    
 
5. Empirical evidence: a slowdown in the pace of health improvement  
In this section we focus on the pace of improvement over 1960-2000 of IMR, U5MR and 
LEB. We extract from the WDI values for these variables for 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 
2000 for 168 countries (see Annex 1) with available information. Missing data for 1960 and 
1970 for several former communist countries of Europe were filled in on the basis of the 
data of the UN Population Prospects, 2002 Revision. We then computed average, population 
weighted, compounded rates of change over the decades of the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s for all the main regions and country groupings, and for China and India separately.  
 
(i) A steady and widespread decline in the rates of improvement in LEB. Table 5 
presents trends in the level of LEB and its annual compounded percentage rate of change 
over the last four decades. The regional averages are obtained by weighting the country 
data for the population size
8. The table documents the rapid gains recorded in the 
                                                 
7 The “asset index” is used to proxy household wealth and income and is used to stratify households into 
quintiles. It is constructed following the procedure described in Filmer and Pritchett (1998) and is based on 
the availability of certain household durables (such as  radios and bicycles), the quality of dwellings (as 
revealed by the type of roof and floor) and access to different of water and sanitation facilities.   
8 The regional averages and measures of dispersion presented in the paper are always weighted by the 
appropriate populations (live births for IMR, and the whole population for LEB). Because of their large 
  12developed and, even more, in the developing countries over the 1960s. In the latter, the 
development of national health systems in newly independent states and the transfer of 
Western public health technologies led to rapid gains in LEB. In the socialist countries of 
Europe such gains were less pronounced and indeed the 1970s they recorded a decline in 
life expectancy due to‘chronic stress’ (Bobak and Marmot 1996) while the 1990s 
witnessed an even more pronounced fall because of the sharp rise in stress related 
cardiovascullar an violent deaths caused by the ‘acute stress’ induced by a highly 
problematic transition to the market economy (Cornia and Paniccià 2001). As a result, in 
2000 LEB in this region was not significantly different than in 1960. The table documents 
also the massive loss of life expectancy caused in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s by the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic and, to a lesser degree, by economic stagnation, the weakening of 
health services, rising inequality and the spread of local conflicts.  
 
Table 5. Levels and annual average rates of change in LEB, 1960-2000   
LEB  Levels  Average annual % rate of change 
  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  60‐70  70‐80  80‐90  90‐00 
High income countries  68.9  70.9  73.8  75.9  77.9  0.28  0.40  0.29  0.25 
Low & middle incombe countries  44.4  55.2  60.0  63.1  64.4  2.20  0.83  0.50  0.20 
‐ Low & Middle Income  (excl. 
China & India)  48.8  53.8  58.6  61.7  62.2  0.99  0.85  0.53  0.08 
            
 ‐ East Asia & Pacific  38.8*  59.1  64.3  67.2  69.0  4.29*  0.86  0.43  0.27 
   ‐ China  36.3 *  61.7  66.8  68.9  70.3  5.45*  0.80  0.30  0.20 
   ‐ East Asia & Pacific (excl. China)  45.9  51.7  57.8  63.0  66.0  1.21  1.13  0.86  0.47 
 ‐ Eastern Europe & Central Asia  65.5  67.9  67.7  69.4  68.5  0.37 ‐ 0.03  0.24 ‐ 0.12 
 ‐ Latin America & Caribbean  56.3  60.4  64.6  67.9  70.3  0.71  0.67  0.50  0.35 
 ‐ Middle East & North Africa  46.9  52.3  58.1  64.3  67.9  1.09  1.06  1.02  0.55 
 ‐ South Asia  43.9  48.9  53.6  58.5  62.4  1.08  0.93  0.88  0.66 
   ‐ India  44.3  49.4  54.2  59.1  62.9  1.08  0.93  0.88  0.62 
   ‐ South Asia (excl. India)  42.3  47.1  51.7  56.5  61.0  1.08  0.94  0.88  0.77 
 ‐ Sub‐Saharan Africa  40.2  44.2  47.6  50.0  46.5  0.94  0.75  0.48 ‐ 0.71 
            
World  50.2*  58.6  62.6  65.3  66.5  1.55*  0.65  0.42  0.19 
World excluding SSA   50.2*  60.4  63.9  66.9  68.9  1.51*  0.56  0.46  0.30 
World excluding SSA and EECA  50.1*  59.4  63.5  66.6  68.9  1.72*  0.67  0.48  0.34 
Source: authors’ calculations on WDI (2004) and UN Population Prospects, 2000 Revision (2002). 
Notes: the regional aggregates include only developing countries (e.g. East Asia does not include 
Japan);* values are influenced by the famine that hit China during the Big Leap Forward of 1959-1961. 
 
However, the main message emerging from the table concerns the steady and generalized 
decline over time in the rate of progress in LEB, a decline that is robust to the remouval 
of Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe from the sample. The second message is that   
such slowdown was most pronounced in the 1990s, possibly suggesting – with the two 
exceptions mentioned above – the emergence of systemic problems with the development 
                                                                                                                                            
populations, China and India exert a strong bias on the regional and even world averages and measures 
of dispersion. In order to better grasp the recent regional and global trends in health well-being we 
calculated also the unweighted averages and measures of dispersion that are presented in Annex 2 for 
reasons of space. As expected, the unweighted dispersion indexes are greater than the weighted ones, 
but broadly confirm the regional and global trends in LEB, (100-LEB), IMR and U5MR and LEB.  
  13pattern followed during this decade, or the influence of unknown factors. This 
conclusion, however, might be biased by the method of calculation of the ‘average annual 
percentage rate of change in LEB’. Indeed, such variable is upper bounded at, say, 100 
years of age
9, thus authomatically forcing smaller absolute and relative gains in countries 
with an already high life expectancy. Thus, barring cases of extreme deteriorations, this 
method of calculation is unable to capture changes in the real rate of progress of LEB.  
 
(ii) A widespread decline over the 1990s in the rate of improvement in (100-LEB). 
To avoid this problem, typically met in measuring progress in upper bounded variables, 
we calculated (Table 6) the average annual compounded rate of change of the difference 
between 100 (the arbitrarily assumed upper bound of LEB) and its observed values, i.e. 
the variable ’life years lost in relation to the maximum attainable LEB’. This variable has 
the advantage of being scale invariant, which means that the computation of rates of 
improvement is independent from the base value of the variable. For instance, in this 
framework, a 2 year rise in LEB in a country with a LEB of 80 generates a 10 percent 
fall, that is identical to that generated by a rise of 6 years in a country with a LEB of 40.  
 
Table 6. Levels and annual average rates of change in (100-LEB), 1960-2000   
  Levels  Average annual rate of change 
  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  60‐70  70‐80  80‐90  90‐00 
High incombe countries  31  29  26  24  22 ‐ 0.64 ‐ 1.04 ‐ 0.86 ‐ 0.84 
Low & middle incombe countries  56  45  40  37  36 ‐ 2.14 ‐ 1.12 ‐ 0.80 ‐ 0.35 
Low & Middle Income excl. China 
& India  51  46  41  38  38 ‐ 1.03 ‐ 1.08 ‐ 0.79 ‐ 0.14 
            
 ‐ East Asia & Pacific  61*  41  36  33  31 ‐ 3.94* ‐ 1.37 ‐ 0.83 ‐ 0.56 
     ‐ Cina  64*  38  33  31  30 ‐ 4.97* ‐ 1.42 ‐ 0.63 ‐ 0.45 
     ‐ East Asia & Pacific excl. China  54  48  42  37  34 ‐ 1.14 ‐ 1.35 ‐ 1.30 ‐ 0.85 
 ‐ Eastern Europe & Central Asia  35  32  32  31  32 ‐ 0.73  0.06 ‐ 0.52  0.28 
 ‐ Latin America & Caribbean  44  40  35  32  30 ‐ 0.99 ‐ 1.10 ‐ 0.98 ‐ 0.78 
 ‐ Middle East & North Africa  53  48  42  36  32 ‐ 1.06 ‐ 1.29 ‐ 1.58 ‐ 1.05 
 ‐ South Asia  56  51  46  42  38 ‐ 0.92 ‐ 0.97 ‐ 1.11 ‐ 0.99 
     ‐ India  56  51  46  41  37 ‐ 0.94 ‐ 0.99 ‐ 1.14 ‐ 0.97 
     ‐ South Asia excl. India  58  53  48  44  39 ‐ 0.86 ‐ 0.91 ‐ 1.03 ‐ 1.08 
 ‐ Sub‐Saharan Africa  60  56  52  50  53 ‐ 0.68 ‐ 0.63 ‐ 0.45  0.66 
            
World  50*  41  37  35  34 ‐ 1.83* ‐ 1.00 ‐ 0.74 ‐ 0.36 
World without SSA  48*  40  36  33  31 ‐ 1.91* ‐ 0.92 ‐ 0.86 ‐ 0.62 
World without SSA and EECA  50*  41  37  33  31 ‐ 2.04* ‐ 1.06 ‐ 0.88 ‐ 0.71 
Source: authors’ calculations based on WDI 2004 and the UN Population Prospects, 2000 Revision (2002). 
Notes: the regional aggregates include only developing countries (e.g. East Asia does not include Japan);* 
these values are influenced by the famine that hit China during the 1958‐1962 Big Leap Forward   
 
                                                 
9 Such upper bound is obviously arbitrary, as the maximum attainable life duration varies over time 
with the development of medical techologies and other factors. Over the medium term, however, it is 
undeniable that we face some kind of immutable genetic maximum that cannot be changed by an 
increase in resources and medical services. The results of the analysis would not change if instead of an 
upper bound of 100 years we had chosen one of, say, 95 or 105 years.      
  14Table 6 points to some of the results identified in Table 5, as in the case of Eastern 
European and Sub-Saharan Africa, but offers a different picture in terms of the trends 
over time in rates of improvement. To start with, it appears that the rate of decline in 
(100-LEB) varies considerably over time, and that the best results were achieved in 
different regions during different decades, i.e. the 1960s in SSA and Eastern Europe (this 
confirming the results of table 5), the 1970s in East Asia, Latin America and the high-
income group, the 1980s in MENA and India and the 1990s in the South Asian countries 
other than India (likely because of the rapid mortality decline recorded in Bangladesh). 
Thus, gone is the conclusion of a steady and generalized decline in rates of improvement.      
 
However, Table 6 confirms – with the usual exception of South Asia other than India – 
the generalized decline in rates of improvement over the 1990s. Besides the cases of 
Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa, a marked slowdown in relation to the prior 
decade is evident in China and the East Asian economies, and a less pronounced one in 
Latin America, MENA and India. Interestingly, the decline recorded in the high income 
countries is modest, suggesting the possibility of continued gains at high levels of LEB.     
  
(iii) A fairly widespread decline over the 1990s in the rate of improvement in IMR 
and U5MR. Table 7 presents the population weighted levels and average annual 
compounded rates of change of IMR over the period 1960-2000.     
 
Table 7. Levels and annual average percentage rates of change in IMR, 1960-2000 
  Levels     Average annual rate of ch’ange 
  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000    60‐70  70‐80  80‐90  90‐00 
High income countries  36  22  12  8  6    ‐4.8 ‐ 5.9 ‐ 4.0 ‐ 2.8 
Low & middle incombe countries  138  107  86  69  62    ‐2.5 ‐ 2.2 ‐ 2.2 ‐ 1.1 
Low & Middle Income  (excl. China & 
India)  129  111  94  75  70 
 
‐1.4 ‐ 1.7 ‐ 2.2 ‐ 0.7 
                 
 ‐ East Asia & Pacific  134*     85     56     43     34    ‐4.4* ‐ 4.1 ‐ 2.6 ‐ 2.3 
    ‐ China  150*     85     49     38     32    ‐5.5* ‐ 5.4 ‐ 2.5 ‐ 1.7 
    ‐ East Asia & Pacific excl. China     91     85     72     52     38    ‐0.7 ‐ 1.7 ‐ 3.1 ‐ 3.2 
 ‐ Eastern Europe & Central Asia   68     53     45     37     32    ‐2.5 ‐ 1.6 ‐ 1.9 ‐ 1.4 
 ‐ Latin America & Caribbean  102     86     61     43     31    ‐1.7 ‐ 3.4 ‐ 3.4 ‐ 3.2 
 ‐ Middle East & North Africa  163  131     94     57     46    ‐2.2 ‐ 3.3 ‐ 4.9 ‐ 2.1 
 ‐ South Asia  147  129  115     88     71    ‐1.3 ‐ 1.1 ‐ 2.6 ‐ 2.1 
      ‐ India  146  127  113     84     68    ‐1.4 ‐ 1.2 ‐ 2.9 ‐ 2.1 
      ‐ South Asia (excl. India)  150  135  121     99     79    ‐1.0 ‐ 1.1 ‐ 2.0 ‐ 2.3 
 ‐ Sub‐Saharan Africa   164  141  116  110**  104**    ‐1.5 ‐ 1.9 ‐ 0.5**    ‐0.6**
                 
World  122  97  79  64  57    ‐2.3 ‐ 2.0 ‐ 2.1 ‐ 1.2 
World excluding SSA  115  91  72  54  45    ‐2.3 ‐ 2.2 ‐ 2.8 ‐ 1.9 
World excluding SSA and EECA  119  93  75  56  45    ‐2.4 ‐ 2.2 ‐ 2.9 ‐ 2.0 
Source: authors’ calculations on WDI (2004) and the UN Population Prospects, 2000 Revision (2002). 
Notes: * these values are influenced by the famine that hit China during the 1959-1961 Big Leap Forward; 
** The WDI IMR data for Sub-Saharan Africa for the 1980s and 1990s have been recently revised and 
describe a less dramatic trend in the 1990s as they spread the deterioration over the last two decades. Such 
revision is however puzzling as a main factor in infant and child mortality has been the rise in HIV adult 
prevalence rate, a phenomenon that has sharply accelerated in the 1990s in relation to the 1980s.    
 
  15In many developing countries, infant deaths represents a large share of the total, and IMR 
is generally considered a key indicators of overall health status. U5MR is an even more 
accurate predictor of health wellbeing, but information on such variable – that correlates 
closely with IMR – is available for only 156 countries. For this reason, as well as for 
reasons of space, this subsection presents only the results of the analysis of IMR trends
10
 
As noted in Fox (1998), the last two decades witnessed a continuation of the 
improvements in key child welfare indicators recorded over 1960-1980. In fact, the 1980s  
recorded the fastest rate of decline in IMR in Latin America, MENA and India (in the rest 
of South Asia the fastest improvements were recorded in the 1990s, owing to the rapid 
fall in mortality recorded in Bangladesh), while fairly high rates of IMR decline were 
sustained in East Asia, Eastern Europe and the advanced countries, the only exception to 
this rule being Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
The fast IMR decline in Latin America and MENA during 1980s is both remarkable and 
puzzling, in view of the recession experienced by both regions and the debt, public 
finance and inequality crisis experienced by Latin America during the same period
11. The 
1980s gains in child survival in these two regions were therefore likely due to the rise in 
parents literacy and female education that are known to enhance the use of family 
resources and facilitate the absorption of health knowledge and appropriate health 
practices. An even greater role was played by the spread of low cost health technologies 
and community-based approaches to health, among which immunisation and oral 
rehydration plaid an important part. As shown in Figure 1, the coverage of DPT3 
immunisation rose in Latin America from below 40 percent in 1980 to 75 percent in 
1990, to level off during the subsequent decade at around 80 percent. In MENA, the 
expansion in immunisation was even more rapid and the rate levelled off at around 85 
percent. In India, progress in immunisation in the 1980s was accompanied by a 
widespread and fairly egalitarian growth that reduced steadily rural poverty. 













1980 1985 1990 1995 1999
Sub-Saharan Africa South Asia
Latin America and Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
CEE/CIS and Baltic States Industrialized countries
East Asia and Pacific
Figure1. DPT3 Percentage Immunization rate,  1980-
1999
 
  Source: Unicef (2001) 
                                                 
10 The results of the U5MR can be obtained from the authors and comparisons among the main trend 
are reported in Annex 2.  The points identified above in the analysis of IMR are broadly confirmed. 
The only difference worth mentioning concerns the more pronounced convergence in U5MR for 
Western Europe in the 1990s.   
11 In contrast, in MENA the public health expenditure/GDP ratio remained at a fairly high 4-5 % of GDP  
during the entire decade. In addition, the region recorded a massive rise in female education made possible 
by large allocations of public funds to education staring from the 1970s. 
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Table 7, however, shows also that the rate of IMR reduction decelerated in the 1990s in all 
but two regions where progress continued at broadly the same pace of the 1980s. In China, 
India, MENA and Eastern Europe the decline was sizeable. This decline is evident also at the 
global level, and is robust to the elimination of Sub.-Saharan Africa and eastern Europe from 
the sample.   
 
It has been argued that such a deceleration has been caused by three main factors. First, the 
levelling off of vaccination (and oral rehydration) coverage at still inadequate rates of ‘herd 
immunity’. Second, in regions with IMR below 30-40 per thousand, the slowdown might be 
due to the elimination of all ‘easy-to-remove’causes of infant death and the difficulties faced 
in dealing with complex and costly perinatal problems. Third, the quasi-stagnation (or, 
according to other data, the rise) of IMR and, even more so, U5MR in Sub-Saharan Africa 
was undoubtedly related to the rise in AIDS deaths among infants and young children. 
Regression analysis by Cornia and Zagonari (2002) for instance estimated that any 
percentage increase in the adult HIV prevalence rate raised U5MR and IMR by 1.57 and 0.88 
points respectively. This means that in countries with high prevalence (say, 20%) the IMR 
rises by about 17 points per thousand, while the corresponding increase in U5MR is almost 
32 points per thousand. While pertinent, these explanations do not tell the whole story and 
can hardly explain the slowdown in IMR in MENA, the economies in transition, China and 
the high-income countries.  A broader set of factors is, therefore, likely at play. 
 
6 Empirical evidence: rising global and intra-regional divergence in the 
distribution of health gains   
The last decade has also witnessed a perceptible increase in between-country health 
inequality, as rates of progress varied substantially across regions and as in several cases 
(not only in Sub-saharan Africa and Eastern Europe) heath indicators worsened, at times 
substantially. This increase in dispersion is observed also within several regions, 
suggesting that the gains in health well-being became increasingly skewed even among 
countries characterized by broadly similar socio-economic conditions. If continued, 
growing regional and global divergence in mortality may lead to an unsustainable 
situation, not only in the areas directly concerned but also globally, as with growing 
regional polarisation in social conditions, spillovers of 'international public bads' 
(conflicts, refugees, drugs and illegal migration) are likely to multiply.  
 
(i) rising global dispersion in LEB and global and regional dispersion in (100-LEB)    
To analyze the evolving dispersion in average life duration, we computed the weighted 
and unweighted coefficient of variation and Gini coefficient
12 of the global and regional 
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in which the countries (i) are ordered by decreasing IMR level, y is the cumulated proportion of infant 
deaths, and x  is the cumulated proportion of the infant population. 
  17distributions of LEB and 100-LEB, (the ’life years lost in relation to the maximum 
attainable LEB’) for the years 1960, 1970, 1980,1990 and 2000.   
 
Table 8 presents the trend over time of the coefficient of variation and the Gini 
coefficient of 100-LEB for the world and its main regions. At the world level, the trend of 
both the coefficient of variation and Gini coefficient follows a U shaped pattern, with 
such variable converging until 1990 and then diverging since then. However, as also 
suggested by Goesling and Firebaugh (2004), such divergence disappears if Sub-Saharan 
Africa is remouved from the sample, as the fairly rapid convergence recorded in South 
Asia (in India and Bangladesh in particular) and in countries of Central Europe (the 
Czech Republic and Poland) compensated the divergence registered in many countries of 
the former Soviet Union and nations such as Iraq, North Korea, Haiti and so on.  
 
Table 8 shows also that while the intra-regional dispersion in (100-LEB) followed a U-
shaped trend in Eastern Europe but a slow but continously diverging one in all other 
regions with the exception of East Asia and Western Europe which registered a clear 
convergence. Interestingly, in SSA there was a ‘downward convergence’ in 100-LEB 
between 1990 and 2000 as the countries that suffered the biggest losses of life expectancy 
(South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana  and so on) where those which had previously 
recorded the largest gains. Except for East Asia, that is dominated by China, these trends 
are more pronounced when the coefficient of variation and the Gini coefficient are 
computed without weighing the life expectancies for the population of each country.    
 
Table 8. Trend in the coefficient of variation and Gini coefficient of the intra-regional 
and global distribution of 100-LEB, 1960-2000   
100‐ LEB  Coefficient of variation (pop. weighted values)    Gini coefficient  (pop. weighted values) 
  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000    1960  1970  1980  1990  2000 
East Asia and Pacific (22)  0.18  0.16  0.16 0.15 0.15   7.98 7.23  7.48 6.51 6.17
L. America & Caribbean (32)  0.12  0.12  0.12 0.12 0.13   6.54 6.17  6.4 6.2 6.49
Middle East & N.Africa (20)  0.10  0.10  0.10 0.12 0.14   3.61 4.06  4.99 6.06 6.78
Sub Saharan Africa (45)  0.07  0.08  0.09 0.11 0.09   3.7 4.33  5.1 5.9 4.59
South Asia (7)  0.05  0.06  0.07 0.07 0.08   1.61 1.89  2.11 2.12 1.94
Eastern Europe & C.Asia (29)  0.15  0.13  0.08 0.05 0.10   6.81 5.55  4.18 2.88 5.44
Western Europe (18)  0.05  0.04  0.04 0.04 0.04   2.29 2.12  2.29 2.10 1.92
North America (2)  Na  na  Na Na Na Na na  Na na Na
        
World (175)  0.27  0.24  0.24 0.23 0.27   15.2 13.32  13.19 12.86 14.18
World excl. SSA (130)  0.28  0.22  0.22 0.20 0.19   15.63 12.57  11.98 10.87 10.31
World excl.SSA & EECA (101)  0.26  0.22  0.22 0.20 0.20   14.47 12.21  12.32 11.31 10.67
Memo item: unweighted values         
World (175)  0.27  0.27  0.28 0.30 0.35 15.4 15.6  16.0 16.8 19.4
World excl. SSA (130)  0.25  0.24  0.23 0.23 0.24 14.2 13.3  12.5 11.8 12.5
Source: authors calculations on WDI (2004). Notes: the regional aggregates include only developing 
countries (e.g. East Asia does not include Japan); the number of countries in each area is in parenthesis.    
 
The analysis of the trends in the CV and Gini coefficient of LEB (the related table is 
omitted for reasons of space) confirms the U shaped trend identified above at the global 
level, indicating that the distribution of life expectancy converged until 1990 and then 
                                                                                                                                            
 
  18started to diverge. Also in this case, such divergence disappears if Sub-Saharan Africa is 
remouved from the sample for the reasons illustrated above. However, when the analysis 
is conducted on LEB the intra-regional trends in the CV and Gini coefficient are 
confirmed for most regions, but not for MENA and Latin America. Indeed, in these two 
regions, the trends are opposite to those identified on the basis of 100-LEB.   
 
It must finally be noted that, for both LEB and 100-LEB, when the coefficients of 
dispersion are computed without weighing for population size, the global divergence in 
health inequality perists in the 1990s even after remouving Sub-Saharan Africa from the 
sample (see bottom of Table 8 for 100-LEB; a similar tendency emerges for LEB, if in an 
attenuated form). All this means that – in terms of countries rather than people - the 
derailment of the long-term convergence in life expectancy predicted by Preston (1976) 
and Wilson (2001) is due to more than the spread of HIV/AIDS and adverse economic 
and conditions in Africa. This is an important point already noted in McMichael et 
al.(2004) that should attract greater attention by policy-makers.     
(ii) increasing global and intra-regional dispersion of IMR and U5MR. Table 9 
presents the trend of the coefficient of variation and Gini coefficient of the distribution of 
the population weighed regional and global IMRs for the years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 
and 2000. The table confirms that, because of the different rates of IMR reduction 
recorded over the last three decades in the different regions (Table 7), the coefficient of 
variation and Gini coefficient of the global distribution of IMR have shown a clear 
upward trend, particularly from 1980 onward, while during the prior two periods there 
was only a modest increse in divergence. This trend is robust, if in a slightly attenuated 
way, to the remouval of Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe from the sample. This 
means that the gains in IMR recorded during the last 2-3 decades have been distributed in 
an increasingly unequal way across countries and that several countries have been left 
behind in this competition.   
 
Table 9. Coefficient of variation and Gini coefficient of the intra-regional and global distribution of IMR   
  Coefficient of variation (pop. weighted values)    Gini coefficient  (pop weighted values) 
 
     
1960       1970       1980      1990      2000
        
1960 
      
1970       1980      1990      2000
East Asia and Pacific (22)  0.31*  0.28  0.38 0.39 0.46   15.2* 12.5 18.4 17.1 17.8
L. America & Caribbean (27)  0.26  0.26  0.34 0.38 0.40   14.2 13.8 18.0 19.9 19.7
Middle East & N.Africa (20)  0.21  0.26  0.29 0.37 0.56   10.6 13.5  15.6 20.3    28.4
Sub Saharan Africa (45)  0.24  0.23  0.25 0.28 0.25   12.8 13.0 13.9 15.3 13.8
South Asia (8)  0.09  0.11  0.13 0.17 0.27   2.50 4.0 4.4 5.3 8.8
Eastern Europe & C.Asia (26)  0.57  0.78  0.68 0.60 0.61   28.5 38.8 33.8 31.9 32.9
Western Europe (18)  0.37  0.35  0.26 0.14 0.18   19.0 17.5 12.6 6.5 9.4
North America (2)  Na  na  Na na Na   na Na na na Na
        
World  (168)  0.41* 0.43 0.51 0.57 0.64     22.2* 24.0  29.0 33.1 35.1
World excl. SSA (123)  0.42*  0.44  0.53 0.55 0.61       22.6* 24.3  30.1 30.5       32.6
World excl. SSA&EECA (97)  0.39*  0.41  0.51 0.54 0.60       20.4* 22.4  28.8 29.7       32.1
Memo item: unweighted values             
World (168)  0.54*  0.61  0.71 0.82 0.90 30.2* 35.1 39.9 44.8 48.8
World excl. SSA (123)  0.58*  0.67  0.77 0.85 0.96 32.9* 37.3  41.5 44.5 48.3
Source: authors’ calculations on WDI 2004; Notes: * these values are influenced by the famine that hit 
China during the 1959-1961 Big Leap Forward. The regional aggregates include only developing countries 
(e.g. East Asia does not include Japan).The number of countries in each area is in parenthesis.    
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Global divergence is found also if the analysis is conducted without weighting the 
national IMR and U5MR for their child populations, though in this case, remouving Sub-
Saharan Africa from the sample reduces visibly the divergence (bottom of Table 9). 
Thus, also in this case, Africa accounts for a good part of the divergence but for not its 
entereity. Other forces are at work in retarding IMR decline across and within regions.     
 
An increase in dispersion in the distribution of country IMR since 1980 is evident also at 
the regional level, i.e. in Latin America, MENA, South Asia and East Asia. In three of 
them, the fastest increase in intra-regional divergence in IMR is observed over 1990-
2000, a period characterized by slow growth, mounting inequality and instability and the 
levelling off or decline in the coverage of key public health interventions in favour of 
children. The exception to this rule are the two ‘crisis regions’ of  Eastern Europe and 
Sub-Saharan Africa both of which show a fluctuating trend characterized by ‘downward 
convergence’ in the 1980s and 1990s as in both regions, the worst performance was 
recorded in countries with already fairly low levels of IMR. In contrast, the dispersion of 
the distribution of national IMRs diminished steadily (save for a blip over 1990-2000, 
that disappears when the regional trend is computed on unweighted data) in Western 
Europe confirming the findings of the literature about the policy-driven equalisation of 
living standards within this region (Micklewright and Stewart 1999).  The same analysis 
carried out on U5MR data for 125 countries yields – unsurprisingly – results similar to 
those identified in the case of IMR. For reasons of space the results are not reported.  
 
Also in this case, if the coefficients of dispersion are computed without weighing the 
national IMR for their population size, the trend towards growing global inequality in 
health appears more pronounced and persists after the remouval of Sub-Saharan Africa 
from the  sample. The intra-regional trends towards growing health divergence are also 
mostly confirmed, and indeed in several cases are more prominent.  
 
To conclude, the analysis of health convergence carried out on IMR and U5MR confirms 
– more clearly than in the case of (100-LEB) or of LEB - that the recent global and intra-
regional health gains were distributed in an increasingly less egalitarian way, particularly 
over the last decade. This conclusion is robust to the choice of the inequality and health 
indicator, and to the weighting or less of the national indicators by means of the 
appropriate national populations. Particularly disturbing is the finding that the increase in 
health divergence across countries is particularly marked for IMR and U5MR.  
 
7 Empirical evidence: frequent rises in within-country IMR differentials   
In this section, we analyze the changes over the last two decades in within-country IMR 
differentials. This kind of analysis is now made possible by the increasing numer of 
countries
13 with at least two Demographic and Health Surveys
14 over the last twenty years.    
                                                 
13 The countries with at least two DHS surveys are, at this date, 36. At the present stage of our research we 
have analysed IMR differentials in the following sample of  21 countries: Bolivia (89, 94,97) Brazil 
(86,91,96) Colombia (86,90,95) Dominican Republic (86,91,96) Guatemala(87,97,99) Peru (85,91,96)   
Burkina Faso(92/93, 99) Cameroon (91, 98) Ghana (88,93,99) Kenya (89,93,98) Madagascar(92,98) Mali 
(87, 96) Niger (92,98) Senegal (86,92/93,97) Tanzania (91/92, 96) Togo (88,98) Uganda (88,97) Zambia 
(92,96) Zimbabwe(88/89, 96) Egypt (92,95) Indonesia (87,91,94,97). We are now expanding the analysis 
to all other countries with at least two point in time, including for the most recent years. 
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An assessment of changes in health differentials could, in principle, be carried out on the 
basis of several health indicators. Information gaps, however, limit severely the choice of 
the differentials that can be calculated on a sufficiently large number of countries and, for 
this reason, our analysis will focus exclusively on IMR
15 differentials for children (a) 
belonging to different quintiles of the income distribution (proxied by an asset index) (b) 
residing in rural vs rural areas, and (c) with  mothers with different levels of education.  
 
(i) trends in IMR differentials by income level (proxied by an asset index). As shown 
in the received literature (section 4), one key IMR differential is that by household 
income. The DHS, now permit to estimate the mortality risk of various population groups 
(including IMR and U5MR) ranked by an assets index that is used to proxy household 
income. The new evidence we provide in this subsection draws on tabulations of the risk 
of deaths faced by infants belonging to five quintiles of the households’ asset distribution 
(World Bank, Research Group on Health, Nutrition, Population and Poverty Division).   
 
In this regard, Table 10 presents the values of IMR at two different points in time for the 
total sample and the bottom and top quintile of the household distribution. The table 
provides also two measures of dispersion, i.e. the interquitile ratio (IQR) i.e. the ratio of 
the IMR of children belonging to the bottom and top quintiles of the asset distribution 
and the concentration coefficient (CC) of the same distribution. While the former only 
captures changes in the tails of the distribution, the concentration coefficient is more 
sensitive to distributive changes affecting the three central quintiles.     
 
Table 10 permits to evaluate the changes over time in average IMR and whether these 
average changes were distributed in an increasingly emore equal or unequal way (as  
signalled by a fall/rises in the interquitile ratio and concentration coefficient). An 
examination of the evidence shows that average IMR fell over time in 12 of the 16 
countries analyzed, stagnated in 1 and worsened in 3. Progress in average IMR, however, 
was accompanied in 60 percent of the ‘cases’ by a rise of the two dispersion measures 
(used here jointly as they provide different information about health inequality
16). 
 
A cross-tabulation of the changes in average IMR and IMR inequality (Table 11) further 
shows that there were many off-diagonal observations, meaning that in many instances an 
average improvement in IMR was accompanied by growing (or unchanged) IMR 
inequality. The upper right box of Table 11 shows, for instance,  that in 12  cases 
                                                                                                                                            
14 DHS are large-scale household sample surveys carried out at periodic intervals. At present DHS exist in 
more than 60 developing and transitional countries. Almost all surveys are representative at the national 
level for the main age groups. Their sample size varies from country to country and, for each country, from 
survey to survey. In our analysis we used data from the children recodes, selections of the main survey (the 
individual recode based on interview of women aged 15-49 or 15-44) containing information about the 
children of 60 (or 36) months of age at the time of the survey. 
 
15 The IMRs used in the analysis of differentials by rural-urban and mother’s education are calculated 
dividing the number of infant deaths under one year of age by the number of births in the three complete 
years preceding the survey, considering also half of the deaths occurred at age 12 months, strictly speaking 
in the second year of life, but which probably occurred in the first year. In contrast, the mortality 
differentials by the asset index are computed on the years preceding the survey. 
 
16 The worsening of IMR differentials was more frequent in the case of  the concentration coefficient.    
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Table 10. Trends in IMR rates and differentials for 16 developing and transition 
economies, 1990s and early 2000s  































Turkey  (1993,  1998)  68.3  99.9 25.4 3.9   48.4 68.3 29.8 2.3    Decline        Decline   
Kazakhstan (1995-99)  40.7  39.2  35.1 1.1   54.9 67.6 42.3  1.6   Rise            Rise  
Colombia (1995,2000)  30.8  40.8  16.2  2.5    24.4  32.0  17.6  1.8   Decline    Rise  
Guatemala  (1995,  1998)  57.2  56.9 35.0 1.6   49.1 58.0 39.2 1.5    Decline    Constant 
Haiti  (1994-5,  2000)  87.1  97.3 74.3 1.3   89.4 99.5 97.2 1.0    Decline      Decline 
Nicaragua  (1997-98,  2001)  45.2  50.7 25.8 1.9   35.3 49.6 16.3 3.0    Rise    Rise 
Peru  (1996,  2000)  49.9  78.3 19.5 4.0   43.2 63.5 13.9 4.6    Rise  …. 
Egypt (1995, 2000)   72.9  109.7  31.8  3.4    54.7  75.6  29.6  2.6   Decline    Decline  
Bangladesh  (1996-7,  1999-00) 89.6  96.5 56.6 1.7   79.7 92.9 57.9 1.6    Decline      Rise 
India (1992-3, 1999)  86.3  109.2  44.0  2.5   73.0 96.5 38.1 2.5  Constant  ..... 
Nepal  (1996,  2001)  93.0  96.3 63.9 1.5   77.2 85.5 53.2 1.6  Rise  Rise 
Cameroon (1991,1998) 80.3  103.9  51.2  2.0    79.8 108.4  55.8 1.9  Decline  ..... 
Ghana  (1993,1998)  74.7  77.5 45.8 1.7   61.2 72.7 26.0 2.8  Rise    Rise   
Malawi  (1992,  2000)  136.1  141.2 106.1 1.3    112.5 131.5 86.4  1.5  Rise  Rise 
Mali  (1995,  2001)  133.5  151.4 93.2  1.6    126.2 137.2 89.9  1.5  Decline    Rise 
Uganda (1995, 2000-1)  86.1  109.0  63.2 1.7   89.4 105.7  60.2 1.8  Rise  ..... 
Source: authors’ elaboration on data from the World Bank, Health, Nutrition, Population and Poverty 
Division (www.worldbank.org/hnp). Note: the IMRs are calculated over the 10 years preceding the survey. 
 
concerning 8 countries most of the benefits of the IMR decline accrued to the middle 
class and the rich. In three cases concerning two countries IMR inequality worsened, as 
expected, in parallel with a rise in average IMR while in another three IMR inequality fell 
despite a rise in IMR. These results, that mainly refer to the period 1992-2001, confirm 
closely the findings of Minujin and Delamonica (2003) on the middle 1980s-middle 
1990s about a widespread rise in U5MR inequality despite an improvement in the mean.     
 
Table 11. Cross tabulation of changes in average IMR versus the interquartile ratio (IQR) 
and concentration coefficient (CC) for 26 inequality changes concerning 16 countries.   




Turkey IQR  Turkey CC 
Colombia IQR 
Guatemala IQR 






Nicaragua IQR Nicaragua CC
Peru IQR 
Bangladesh CC  
Nepal IQR,  Nepal CC 
Ghana IQR  Ghana CC 
Malawi IQR, Malawi CC 
Mali CC 
Average  










Average   
Worsening in  
IMR 
Haiti IQR, Haiti CC    Kazakhstan IDR,  
Kazakhstan CC 
Uganda IQR  
 
Source: authors’ compilation on the basis of the data report in Table 10. Note: changes of less than 4% are 
considered to indicate that the variable has remained constant  
 
  22(ii) Trends in IMR differentials by rural vs urban residence. In this case we 
calculated the rural/urban IMR differential on DHS surveys spanning the period 1985-99. 
DHS analysts normally compute IMR differentials over a 10 year period so as to reduce 
the sampling and estimation error. This procedure has the disadvantage, however, to 
preclude practically all analyses of changes over time in the IMR level and differentials. 
For this reason, we have calculated the IMR over 3-year periods so as to be able to 
capture the changes in IMR over the medium term and because the longer the period 
considered, the likelier that the mothers included in the sample are age selected and the 
more frequent the recall errors. Our choice however reduces sample size and risks to 
affect the stability of the IMR estimates. As in other cases, the data may also be affected 
by errors common in this kind of survey, such as omission of registrations, misreporting 
of age, recall error an so on. The analysis is conducted assigning each of the above 
surveys  to three sub-periods: mid-late-80s, early-90s and to mid-late-90s.  
 
In the mid-late-80s, in the majority of the Sub-Saharan African countries had fairly high 
IMR averages but moderate rural-urban gap, ranging between 0.7 and 1.7. Differentails 
were, however, somewhat more pronounced in Latin America (Table 12, 5
th column).  In 
many cases, the changes observed between the 1980s and 1990s point to an exacerbation 
of such differentials  though there were also cases of   narrowing of the gap.  Altogether,  
Table 12.  IMR by rural/urban residence and rural-urban IMR ratio in  selected countries  
Country Mid-late-80s  Early-90s  Mid-late-90s 


















B.  Faso  ….  …..  …. …. 104  71  110  1.54  111  64  116  1.81 
Cameroon  63  61 64 1.05  ….  …..  …..  ….  76 75 76 1.01 
Ghana  89  75 94 1.26  62 50 66 1.31  64 48 69 1.43 
Kenya  71  69 72 1.03  71 74 71 0.96  68 54 71 1.33 
Madagascar  95  63  100  1.58      81  89  79  0.89 
Mali  142  98  156 1.59  109 80  119 1.49  ….  ….. ….. …. 
Niger  134  84  144  1.70  …. …. …. …. 91  58  98  1.70 
Senegal  109  94 117  1.24  72 50 83 1.65  80 56 912  1.63 
Tanzania  91  121  83 0.69  90 68 95 1.40  ….  …..  ….  ….. 
Togo  97 83  102  1.24  …. …. …. …. 69  61  71  1.17 
Uganda  121 114  122  1.07 76  79  75  0.96 ….  ….  ….  …. 
Zambia  110  90  126 1.41  115 113 117 1.04  ….  ….  ….  …. 
Zimbabwe  55  36 62 1.72  54 47 57 1.23  ….  ….  ….  …. 
Bolivia  91  77 105  1.36  65 56 76 1.35  67 47 92 1.98 
Brazil  75  55 116  2.10  79 59 100  1.68  41 32 68 2.13 
Colombia 36 36  39  1.11  …. …. …. …. 33 30 37 1.23 
Peru  94  64 127  1.98  54 37 80 2.14  47 33 68 2.08 
Guatemala  89  72 96 1.34  53 37 61 1.66  .....  .... .... .... 
Dominican R70  70 70 1.00  ...  ...  ...  ...  51 41 64 1.56 
Egypt  70  50 81 1.63  65 47 76 1.61  .....  .....  .....  ..... 
Indonesia  73  55 80 1.46  68 34 81 2.41  46 31 52 1.67 
Source: authors’ calculations on selected DHS 
 
there were nine cases in which the rural-urban IMR ratio worsened, four in which it 
remained broadly unchanged and six in which the gap narrowed. In addition in Egypt and 
Indonesia the rural-urban gap remained very high despite a decline in the nationwide 
IMR. As a whole, the trends observed in Sub-Saharan Africa appears rather composite 
with no clear relation between IMR reduction and r/u convergence. The rural areas 
continue to be disadvantaged with respect to infant health. In contrast, all Latin American 
countries experienced either the persistence of the r-u IMR gap at a high level (around 2) 
  23or its further widening, suggesting the operation of a very skewed urban-based pattern of 
development. As for Egypt, the data refer to two immediately contiguous 3-year periods 
in the late-80s and early-90s, during which only limited reductions in IMR were achieved 
while the r/u ratio remained unchanged at a high level (1.6).In Indonesia the decline in 
IMR accelerated during the 90s, but the r/u rate remained broadly constant. Also in this 
case, more focus on rural areas would have allowed to achieve a faster overall decline – 
and a more balanced distribution of  welfare. 
Also in this case, a cross-tabulation of changes in average IMR versus the rural/urban 
IMR ratio shows there are many off-diagonal observations, meaning that in many 
countries nationwide progress in IMR was accompanied by growing (or unchanged) 
rural/urban IMR ratio. The top-right quadrant of Table 13 shows in fact that in 7 
countries most of the national IMR decline was recorded in urban areas. In another four 
countries experiencing a fall in average IMR, rural/urban gap remained unchanged at 
fairly high levels, revealing in this way the limits of location-neutral policies. The gap 
worsened also in two countries where there had been no changes in the nationwide IMR 
tare. In brief, as seen in Table 13, 12 countries (those above the main diagonal) out of 20 
registered an unsatisfactory change in the r/u IMR ratio suggesting further divergence in 
rural-urban health inequality or the persistence of a high urban bias despite gains in 
average IMR.  
 
Table 13. Cross tabulation of IMR changes in relation to changes in the r/u IMR  ratio in 
selected developing countries, mid-late 1980s to mid-late 1990s  
  Falling  r/u  
IMR ratio 
Constant r/u  
IMR ratio 



























Average   
Worsening in 
IMR 
 Cameroon  Burkina  Faso 
 
2 
   Source: author’s elaboration on selected DHS; Note: changes of less tha 4% are supposed   
   to indicate that the variable has remained constant  
  
(iii) IMR differentials by level of education of the mother. For this analysis, we 
computed the IMR by the following levels of education of the mother: no education, 
primary education, secondary/higher education. For some countries of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the comparison was limited to mothers with no or primary education, as mothers 
with higher education were very too few to estimate IMR for that educational group.  
 
Table 14 shows that in the early 1980s, IMR varied markedly with the level of education 
of the mother, thus confirming, unsurprisingly, the findings of a vast body of literature 
(Section 5). Infants born to illiterate mothers had a risk of death 10% to125% higher than 
that of infants borne to mothers with primary education (but Tanzania, Togo and Uganda 
and Guatemala were an exception to this rule) and 149 and 521 % higher than infants 
borne to mothers with secondary or higher education. The risk of death of children with 
  24mothers with primary in relation to those whose mothers completed at least the secondary 
education showed considerable variability. 
 
The trends in these three IMR differentials (no education/primary in panel A, and no 
education/secondary and primary/secondary in panel B) show a composite picture, not 
always easy to interpret. The first IMR gap (no education/primary) declined in ten cases 
out of 17, rose in 5 and remained broadly constant in two. However, in seven of the ten 
cases of decline (Cameroun, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Senegal, Zambia, Zimbabwe and 
Guatemala) such decline resulted from ‘downward convergence’, as the IMR of children 
borne to  mothers  with  primary  education  rose  while  that  of  those  borne  to illiterate  
 
Table14. IMR by level of education of the mother in selected countries 





















B. Faso  ...  ...  ...  105 107 0.99 113 88   1.28
Cameroon 96    43  2.25 ... ... ...  92 73   1.26
Ghana 97    81  1.20 75 56  1.33 67 71   0.94
Kenya 83    73  1.13 68 81  0.84 72 89   0.81
Madagscar 121 102  1.18 ... ... ...  107 79   1.36
Mali 152   77  1.97 111 100 -1 . 1 1 ... ... ... 
Niger 138 116  1.19 ... ... ...  94 71   1.32
Senegal 114   84  1.35 78 56  1.39 85 73   1.17
Tanzania 90    92  0.98 115 82  1.40 … … … 
Togo 101   98  1.03 … … …  68 72   0.95
Uganda 127 119  1.07 81 77  1.05 … … … 
Zambia 134 109  1.23 119 119  1.00 … … … 
Zimbabwe 79    49  1.60 66 60  1.11 … … … 
Egypt 81  66  1.24 91 51  1.79 … … … 
Indonesia              
              
Bolivia 120 103  1.17 96 79  1.21 99 84  1.18
Brazil  106   82  1.29 135 63  2.14 102 53  1.94
Peru 177 100  1.77 84 78  1.08 69 62   1.12
Guatemala 93    94  0.98 67 51  1.32 48 59   0.82
Panel B. 


















Cameroon 41  2.36  1.05 ... ... ...  61   1.51  1.19
Kenya 46  1.79  1.58 48 1.42 1.7  41 1.77  2.19
Madagascar 52 2.31  1.95 ... ... ...  53 2.02   1.49
Zambia 89  1.49  1.21 102 1.16 1.17 ... ... ... 
Zimbabwe 50  1.57  0.98 45 1.48 1.33 ... ... ... 
Egypt 50  1.64  1.32 40 2.28 1.27    
Indonesia                
              
Bolivia 50  2.40  2.06 35 2.72 2.25 37   2.67  2.26
Brazil 20  5.21  4.02 25 5.39 2.52 25   4.16   2.15
Peru 47  3.74  2.11 29 2.85 2.65 31   2.23  1.99
Domin. Rep.  58  ...  1.30 30 ...  1.58 36 ...  1.54
Source: authors’ estimates on selected DHS 
 
  25mothers remained constant or fell. It is unclear at this point whether such ‘downward 
convergence’ reflects some real local dynamics (such as higher HIV infection rates 
among educated women, as reported in the literature for some African countries), 
inaccurate reporting or sampling errors in estimating the IMR of children borne to 
mothers with primary or secondary education.  
 
Likewise, the mortality gap of infants borne to mothers with no education in relation to 
those borne to mothers with no secondary and higher education fell in 5 of the 8 countries 
analyzed in panel B of Table 14. In this case, in contrast, we observe a kind of ‘upward 
convergence’ as in almost all cases the decline in the gap is due to a stagnation or slow 
decline in mortality among infants of mothers with secondary/higher education and a 
more pronounced fall in that of mothers with no education. Here too, more detailed 
investigations are needed to understand what drives this phenomenon. Yet, even in 
countries where this mortality gap declined the infants born to mothers with secondary 
education continued having a much lower mortality risk than the children of mothers with 
no or primary education. 
 
Finally, the IMR gap between women with primary to secondary and higher education 
increased in 5 countries out of 9, declined in 2 and remained constant in another two, thus 
possibly pointing to an emerging mortality divergence between people with low and 
medium-high levels of education. Also in this case, what sems to drive this growing 
differential is the rise in IMR among children of mothers with primary education.  
 
In conclusion, Table 14 seems to be pointing – though with considerable variation - to a 
broadly favourable trend in the IMR of infants of uneducated mothers, a less favourable 
but still broadly positive one for those mothers with secondary and higher education and 
an often negative one for mother with primary education. As noted above, in view of the 
peculiarity of this last trend, these results need further probing.       
 
8. Summary, conclusions and indications for further work  
The data problems mentioned throughout this paper – as those encountered in the 
estimation of aggregate IMR and LEB in Sub-Saharan Africa or the instability of IMR 
estimates derived from narrow DHS sample – suggest some caution in interpreting the 
results presented above. Yet, the above discussion points to a few important conclusions 
(summarized in Table 15), some fairly robust, some still tentative.  
 
To start with, the rate of improvement of both income and health indicators slowed down 
over the last twenty years in relation to the 1960s and 1970s. In developing and 
transitional countries, the slowdown in growth was most pronounced in the 1980s and 
that in health in the 1990s. The reasons for this lag have still to be worked out. 
Furthermore, in both cases, there are important exceptions that need to be investigated 
more in detail to grasp the reasons of their comparatively favourable performance. In 
MENA and Latin America, for instance, the 1980s witnessed considerable gains in health 
wellbeing inspite of flat or negative income growth and, in the case of Latin America, 
rising inequality. However, except for these exceptions, the slowdown in rates of 
progress was sufficiently general to suggest the working of some systemic factors. 
Indeed, for both income and health, the slowdown is robust to the remouval of Sub-
Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe from the sample, thus invalidating the viewpoint that 
attributes the current slowdown exclusevly to the difficulties faced by the Eastern 
European transition and the spread of AIDS, civil conflicts and economic stagnation in 
  26Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, though with exceptions and different time profiles, the 
slowdown in the aggregate rates of improvement in well-being in the 1908s and 1990s 
seems to be fairly general.  
 
Table 15. Summary of gains in well-being over the 1980s and 1990s in relation to the 
two prior decades.   
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Second, while it is impossible to come to a simple conclusion about the changes in the 
distribution of income between-countries during the Era of Globalisation as these hinge 
crucially on the statistical conventions followed for the construction of the global income 
distribution, our paper shows that the between-country distribution of health well-being  
has unambigously deteriorated, regardless of the remouval of Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Eastern Europe from the sample. In addition, with the exception of Western Europe and 
  27East Asia (in the case of 100-LEB) and of Western Europe and Eastern Europe (in the 
case of IMR/U5MR), the intra-regional distribution of health gains shows increased 
divergence. These are important conclusions as, so far, there was little agreement in the 
literature on the convergence in well-being during the last two turbulent decades. Our 
paper also suggests that where public policy actively aimed at reducing well-being 
differentials among groups of countries, as in the European Union, both incomes per 
capita and health well-being converged steadily.  
 
Finally, the within-country distribution of well-being appears to have worsened in the 
majority of the cases analyzed. As noted, there is substantial evidence that within-country 
income inequality increased in two thirds of the countries with available data. In the case 
of mortality data, such trends is less universal and needs to be confirmed on a longer time 
period and broader sample of DHS than that we were so far able to access. Be as it may, 
our results show there is initial evidence of divergence in IMR differentials by an asset 
index and rural/urban location in about 55-60% of the cases, while the trend of the IMR 
differentials by the level of education of the mother is unclear.  
 
What are the factors behind the changes in health well-being discussed above? In view of 
data problems and level of aggregation of the analysis, these points made below are in 
some cases speculative and must be taken as suggestions for further work rather than firm 
conclusions on causality.   
 
To start with, there is no doubt that spread of HIV/AIDS exerted a major influence on 
IMR, U5MR and LEB in most of Africa and a few Carribean countries and that – barring 
new  breakthroughs in medical research – will likely continue to do so in a growing 
number of countries in the years ahead. It is important to note, in this regard, that future 
AIDS-related mortality – as that of the 1990s – will be influenced by the way 
globalisation (and in particular the TRIPS agreement) will affect the cost and transfer of 
health technology (antiretrovirals in particular) in the areas affected by the epidemic. As 
noted by Deaton (2004), if this trasmission is delayed or retarded, mortality differentials 
will continue to diverge because of wrong policies.  
 
Yet, it is not possible to place all the blame for the unsatisfactory health performance of 
the last decade on HIV/AIDS, especially in the those nations and regions, where HIV 
adult prevalence rates are low or zero, that have nevertheless recorded slow health 
improvements and growing health inequality. In this regard, a second, not too 
controversial, possible cause of the slow health improvement and growing divergence 
concerns health spending and health programmes. The debate about globalisation has 
often highlighted the risk posed to revenue collection by liberal tax reforms, tax 
competition among developing countries and globalisation-driven outsorcing and 
informalisation of the economy. Yet, the evidence in this regard is mixed. While there are 
examples of countries (such as China and the economies in transition) that reduced 
sharply public health expenditure and access to health services, in others (such as several 
ones from MENA and Latin America) public health expenditure actually increased or 
remained constant at a pretty high level. However, public health expenditure may be too 
noisy a variable to clearly influence health changes. In contrast, it is generally accepted 
that an expansion of key public health programs such as child immunisation, oral 
rehydration, the provision of antibiotics and pregnancy control can deliver important 
health gains even during periods of stagnation of health expenditure. Simmetrically, it is 
possible that a stagnation or decline in the coverage of such programs (as often observed 
  28in the 1990s) may have affected adversely IMR and U5MR even in the presence of an 
expanding health budget. Research can help quantifying the relative mortality impact of 
changes in coverage rates of key interventions versus health spending. 
 
Third, mortality has also been affected by a raising wave of local conflicts and natural 
disasters. Those of Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, El Salvador, 
Ethiopia, Guatemala, Iraq, Kosovo, Mozambique, North Korea, Rwanda, Somalia, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan and Uganda are just a few of the most acute humanitarian crises in which 
death rates have risen markedly. Yet, only crude estimate of the health impact of such 
crises are available and only in few cases is it possible to capture the impact of these  
tragic events on aggregate mortality trends. Existing databases likely under-report and 
under-estimate the direct mortality cost of these events.  
 
Fourth, changes in the structure and stability of households – and social cohesion more 
generally - may have also affected, if more subtly, current health trends. The traditional 
family has in fact been eroded in many places thus exposing its members to greater health 
risks, as suggested by micro studies that identify a greater death risk for children, elderly 
and adults living in incomplete families. In this regard, the last  twenty years have seen a 
rise in the number of people living in incomplete households because of divorce, 
separation, lone parenthood, single-hood, migration of the head of the household or death 
of parents or a spouse. For instance, lone-parent families represent 10-15 per cent of all 
OECD families with dependent children and a higher percentage in Latin America, the 
Carribean and parts of South East Asia. Such trend has surfaced even in China where 
traditional values usually left no space for such type of family arrangement. And, in the 
HIV-AIDS affected countries the number of orphans affected by a risk of non-AIDS 
mortality has risen well above the level that can be handled through extended family 
arrangements. In other countries, such as Bosnia and Ethiopia, war and ethnic conflicts 
have caused a sharp increase in the number of incomplete families. Meanwhile in Russia, 
Moldova and other economies in transition, the number of biological or social orphans has 
risen rapidly because of soaring parental mortality and migration and child abandonment.  
 
Last but not least, a host of empirical data and theoretical arguments make it difficult to 
accept that the slower growth and higher income inequality
17 of the last twenty years are 
unrelated to botched liberalisation and globalisation policies, and in particular to the 
impact of loose domestic banking deregulation, premature external liberalisation and 
                                                 
17 Much is known about the relation between income inequality and health inequality. To start with, it is 
generally accepted that, as the relation between income per capita and life expectancy is concave, an increase in 
income inequality will – ceteris paribus - cause a fall in life expectancy among the poor and middle class 
bigger than the gain in life expectancy among the rich. Second, high inequality reduces access to health care by 
the poor both because these have a lower amount of income to buy it in the market and as hign inequality 
reduces the state capacity to to tax the élites, thus reducing its ability to provide subsidized health services. 
Third, it is also accepted that – ceteris paribus - high inequality raises the crime rate and the violent deaths. 
Fourth, there is initial evidence that – at least in advanced countries and transitional economies – high 
inequality leads to more stratified societies and loss in social cohesion that affect the ability of communities to 
undertake collective action , to a more hierarchal organisation of work causing loss of control and worse health 
outcomes, and to rising psychosocial stress.  Finally, there is considerable – though not universally accepted – 
evidence that high incomr inequality affects health status via a decline in GDP growth. Indeed, most theories 
and empirical analyses suggest that lower growth GDP would result because of low investment in human 
capital, increased macroeconomic disequilibria and balance of payment instability, decreasing returns to capital, 
rising social instability, declining work incentives, and growing policy distortions and government fauilures.  
 
  
  29regressive tax reforms, and that all this has had no impact on health trends. Indeed, both 
theory and empirical evidence show that slower growth, greater income inequality and 
rising volatility affect health progress and inequality. Thus, it is likely, that the recent 
health trends were influenced by the sluggish growth and mounting income inequality of 
the last twenty years, especially in the 120 or so countries with a GDP per capita of less 
than US$ 2000, in which health improvements are particularly income-elastic, or in the 
transitional economies affected by huge and unanticipated changes in economic 
variables. The precise extent and mechanisms of such an impact remain however 
undocumented in most cases. This is a priority area for research in which the existing 
theories linking economic growth and income inequality to health and health inequality 
have to be tested on enlarged datasets and time periods. Perhaps, this new research will 
help bringing about a more humane globalisation promoting faster health progress and 
health convergence over the next decades.  
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Annex 1. List of countries included in the calculation of the IMR trends and coefficients 
of dispersion in the text  
 
(i) IMR.   Western Europe (18): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
East Asia and Pacific (22) Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Korea (Democratic 
Republic), Korea (Republic), Lao, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Island, Thailand, Vanuatu, Vietnam. Latin America and 
Caribbean (27) Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela. Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia (26) Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan,  Ukraine, Uzbekistan. Middle East and North Africa (20) Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. North America (2) Canada, United States of America. South Asia 
(8) Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. Sub Saharan Africa (45) 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic), Congo (Republic), Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe. 
 
  32(ii) Life Expectancy.   Western Europe (18): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom. East Asia and Pacific (22) Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, 
Korea (Democratic Republic), Korea (Republic), Lao, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Papua 
New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Island, Thailand, Vanuatu, Vietnam.  Latin America 
and Caribbean (32) Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.  Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(29) Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan,  Ukraine, Uzbekistan.  Middle East and North Africa (20) Algeria, 
Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. North America (2) Canada, United States of 
America.  South Asia (7) Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. Sub 
Saharan Africa (45) Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic), Congo (Republic), Cote d’Ivoire, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
  33